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If you ask Americans whether it is time to get beyond racial
preferences, the vast majority will say yes.' If you ask, instead, the
question posed to Panel III of the conference, The Rehnquist Court and
the American Dilemma,--"Is it time to get beyond race?"-the answer
may be more ambivalent. The two questions are quite different, and
the merging of them has caused a great deal of confusion in the legal
and political battles over affirmative action.2 It may very well be time
to "get beyond racial preferences," even though we cannot "get
beyond race" entirely. It may be significantly more difficult to "get
beyond race" because this might encompass three very different
things.
First, taken literally, the notion might be that humans interacting
with one another would come to a point where they place on skin
color the same significance they place on eye color. This seems an
unlikely development. Even if there was widespread interracial
marriage, as Professor Frank Wu advocated in Panel II, we know that
humans are acutely attuned to the most minute differences in skin
tone and shade. In short, if "getting beyond race" means actually
getting beyond consciousness of race, the goal is hopelessly naive and
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Robb. He is also the author of BROKEN CONTRAcT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW ScHOOL (1992)
and THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACrION (forthcoming May 1996).
1. See generally PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, THE SCAR OF RAE (1993) (exploring
new politics of race in 1980s and 1990s through analysis of results of public opinion surveys);
Richard Morin & Sharon Warden, Americans Vent Anger at Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Mar.
24,1995, at Al (reporting results of ABC News Poll fmdingAmericans oppose racial preferences
by margin of 75% to 24%).
2. The scope of this Essay is limited to affirmative action in education, employment, and
contracting. It does not discuss the quite different question of affirmative action in the voting
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fantastical, a point which advocates of racial preference are quick to
emphasize.
On a second level, "getting beyond race" might mean getting
beyond official governmental recognition of race. Social critic
Michael Lind argues in The Next American Nation3 that the govern-
ment should cease to recognize racial categories. According to Lind,
"[t] he color-blind liberals were right, in the early 1960s, to favor the
complete elimination of government racial labels."4
There is an element of this thinking as well in those who advocate
adopting a "multiracial" category in the government's collection of
data. In order to get beyond official race categories, however, one
must be willing to assume we are truly beyond the need for tough
enforcement of existing antidiscriminatory statutes. In fact, at least
two widely supported mechanisms of civil rights enforcement require
consciousness of race.
First, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,' which codifies the Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' requires the
collection of racial data. The Act, overwhelmingly supported in
Congress, steers a sensible course between requiring racial preference
on the one hand, and placing the entire burden of proving discrimi-
nation on victims on the other hand. Under the Act, when an
employment practice produces a statistical racial imbalance, or
"disparate impact," in the workplace, employers bear the burden of
defending the practice with reference to a race-neutral justification of
"business necessity."' Abolish racial categories, and the Act becomes
unenforceable. Likewise, old-style affirmative action guidelines, which
require employers to cast a wider net to garner a diverse applicant
pool (without providing preferences in decisionmaking), require race
to be a definable category. This practice is widely supported, backed
by conservatives and liberals alike.
Instead, the real controversy over "getting beyond race" is on a
third level; that is, are we ready to "get beyond racial preferences?"
Have we reached a point in our history where we are done repaying
the debt of slavery and segregation? Are we ready to be color-blind
in our distribution of benefits and burdens?
3. MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION (1995).
4. Id. at 305.
5. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.(1994)).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggsheld that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employers
from instituting employment procedures unrelated to job performance yet which operated to
disqualify substantially more blacks than whites. Id. at 436.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (1994).
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Publicly, both sides of the mainstream affirmative action debate
profess to want color-blindness in the end; there is disagreement,
however, over the means to achieving that agreed upon goal.8 For
example, even Professor Lani Guinier, President Clinton's controver-
sial nominee to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
proclaimed that Martin Luther King's dream of an eventually
color-blind society "is my dream too."9 She and other proponents
of preference, such as Professor Angela Davis, argue that we are still
not ready. In her Conference keynote address, Davis argued that
conservatives have misrepresented King's call to judge people not "by
the color of the skin but by the content of their character."10 Davis
notes that conservatives fail to mention that King was describing an
aspiration, that he "looked forward" to the day of color-blindness.
Others argue that the best way to become color-blind is to eliminate
racial preferences now."
The debate is typified by the celebrated written exchange between
Justice Harry Blackmun and Professor William Van Alstyne. In Regents
of University of California v. Bakke, 2 Justice Blackmun argued that
"[iln order to get beyond racism we must first take account of
race."'3 To fail to remedy some 300 years of oppression would be
patently unfair, he argued, 4 and today's advocates say thirty years of
racial preference has hardly done the job. To Justice Blackmun's
argument, Professor Van Alstyne replied that "one gets beyond racism
by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible
commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or
practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other
8. In academic circles, by contrast, long-run color-blindness is not an agreed upon goal.
See generally Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79
VA. L. REV. 461 (1993) (listing major works documenting development of "critical race theory");
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758 (exploring roots of "critical race theory").
9. LANI GuINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrY 191 (1994).
10. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 104 (James M. Washington ed., 1992).
11. SeeJames Richardson, UCKillsAffirmativeAction, S.F. BEE,July 21, 1995, atAl (quoting
California Governor Wilson as saying "diversity can be achieved naturally," in support of
University of California Board of Regents' vote to abolish racial and gender based affirmative
action); Sonya Ross, Dole Wants End to All Federal Affirmative Action Programs, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
July 28, 1995, at A14 (describing Sen. Dole's proposed Equal Opportunity Act of 1995 that
would eliminate federal affirmative action programs and would be what he describes as "a
starting point" for new color-blind age).
12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun's words track McGeorge Bundy's earlier
articulation. SeeMcGeorge Bundy, TheIssueBefore the Court: Who GetsAhead in America?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 1977, at 41, 54 ("To get past racism, we must here take account of race.").
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407.
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human beings by race."15 Van Alstyne argued that race-conscious
means contradict the color-blind ends, thus racial preferences
inevitably encourage people to think in racial terms.
The paradox of affirmative action is that there is some plausibility
to both arguments. To leave the legacy of past discrimination
unremedied is to risk freezing the unjust status quo. Alternatively, to
use racial preferences as a remedy puts the means in direct tension
with the color-blind end. One possible answer to this conundrum
is to provide race-neutral preferences to the disadvantaged; that is,
preferences by class, not race.
16
Providing preferences to disadvantaged people generally is at once
color-blind and cognizant of our nation's history. As a result of
slavery and segregation, blacks remain disproportionately poor and
would disproportionately benefit from a class-based preference to the
extent that the economic legacy of the past remains. The means
themselves, however, would be color-blind, thereby obviating the
legitimate argument of many whites that there is not a scientific causal
link between past discrimination against a group and the provision of
a preference to individual members of that group some time later.
King himself argued that race-blind programs for the poor are an
appropriate response to the legacy of slavery and segregation. King
clearly saw the need for compensation. "[Ilt is obvious," he wrote,
"that if a man is entered at the starting line in a race three hundred
years after another man, the first would have to perform some
impossible feat in order to catch up with his fellow runner."17 King
proposed as a remedy a Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged." The
fact that poor whites would benefit, and wealthy blacks would not, was
of little concern to him. "While Negroes form the vast majority of
America's disadvantaged," he wrote, "there are millions of white poor
who would also benefit from such a bill.""
Even those wedded to racial preferences on the merits need to
explore the class preference alternative as a matter of legal and
political necessity. The courts in recent years have come down much
closer to Van Alstyne than to Blackmun. For example, in City of
15. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) (emphasis in original).
16. For a further description of the mechanics of this proposal, see RICHARD KAHLENBERG,
THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATrvE AcrION (forthcoming May 1996); Richard
Kahlenberg, Class, Not Race, NEv REPUBiC, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21, 21-27.
17. MARTIN LUTHER KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 134 (1964).
18. Id. at 137.
19. Id. at 138.
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Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.2° and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2 1
the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to state and federal
affirmative action programs.2  While President Clinton likes to
emphasize that seven of nine Justices in Adarand said affirmative
action is sometimes appropriate, instances of racial classifications
surviving strict scrutiny are extremely rare.23  By contrast, class
preferences are constitutionally unassailable. Because the left lost the
great effort to get "class" categorized as suspect under Equal
Protection jurisprudence, 24 there is no double-edged sword with
which conservatives can strike down benefits for the poor. Politically,
the fate of racial preferences has always been fragile, saved only by a
bipartisan consensus among moderate elites. The days of dodging
bullets, however, may be over, as the question is now being posed
directly to the electorate. In November 1996, the California Civil
Rights Initiative (CCRI) is slated to ask voters to evaluate the simple
proposition that the state should not discriminate against, or grant
preferences in favor of, individuals on the basis of race, gender, or
national origin.25 Polls show that passage is likely.
26
Even where preference programs are more insulated from popular
opinion, progressives need to be concerned about the larger political
impact of supporting racial preference programs. King saw the
20. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
22. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (remanding with
instructions to use strict scrutiny in evaluating federal affirmative action plan); City of Richmond
v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (striking down city's plan requiring 30% of
construction contracts to be awarded to minority businesses).
23. For a rare exception to the rule that strict scrutiny is fatal to racial classifications, see
Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that reparation payments made
to Japanese Americans interned during World War II survive both intermediate and strict
scrutiny), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 831 (1992). Most affirmative action programs fail to meet the
narrow tailoring of this program. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (explaining that 30% quota was not
sufficiently related to number of minority contractors in Richmond and appeared to be chosen
"arbitrarily"); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (holding that racially
preferential layoff plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored because less intrusive means, such
as hiring goals, were available).
24. SeeJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAcYAND DISTRusr 148 (1980) ("The retreat from the once
glittering crusade to extend special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a
rout.").
25. The text reads, in part: "Neither the State of California nor any of its political
subdivisions or agents shall use race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for
either discrimination against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group in
the operation of the state's system of public employment, public education, or public
contracting." Mona Charen, Lack of Funds Threatens California Civil Rights Initiative, FRESNO BEE,
Nov. 2, 1995, at B7; see also Cynthia Craft, Senator Assails Santa Cruz Chancellor over Angela Davis
Honor, LA TIMEs,July 21, 1995, atB5; Cathleen Decker, Backers of Affirmative Action Face a Tough
Task Politics, LA TmEffS, Aug. 7, 1995, at A3.
26. Charen, supra note 25, at B7 (citing Field poll that found 65% approval for initiative
in early September 1995).
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divisive potential of racial preferences, and wrote, "Nothing would
hold back the forces of progress in American life more effectively
than a schism between the Negro and organized labor."27 To some
conservatives, the advent of racial preferences was desirable precisely
because of their divisive potential. It is true, as Dean Jamin Raskin
argued, that Richard Nixon backed racial preferences in part because
they were modest and nonthreatening to the Establishment.28 A part
of Nixon's reasoning, however, was much more devious. According
to former Nixon aide John Ehrlichman, Nixon imposed racial
preferences on the Philadelphia construction industry in part to
punish labor and to break up the old New Deal coalition of labor and
civil rights groups.29 Once preferences were on the table, and were
gradually embraced by Democrats, Nixon denounced the very quota
plan he had enacted, helping to spur massive white working-class
flight to the Republican Party."° Likewise, Professor Frank Wu is
wrong to blame the California Civil Rights Initiative for pitting Asians
against blacks; it is the underlying policies of preference that by their
very nature divide.3" Adding women to the mix of preference
beneficiaries would seem to help those who back preferences
politically, but in fact, women oppose gender preferences at almost
the same rate as men. 2
In response to the political and legal assaults on affirmative action,
proponents of preference programs have developed two new sets of
arguments to supplement the old compensatory justification. First,
race preferences are necessary to prevent ongoing racial discrimina-
tion; and, second, that preferences are necessary to promote diversity.
Both rationales contain problems of their own.
There can be no doubt that racial discrimination remains a
continuing tragedy in our society. At the Conference keynote
address, Professor Angela Davis spoke of cab drivers routinely
bypassing black passengers, and in 'Panel III, Professor Katheryn
Russell pointed to the racial hoax phenomenon, in which white
criminals like Susan Smith try to blame their crimes on innocent
27. KING, supra note 17, at 142.
28. See Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 567 (1996).
29. JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER 218 (1982).
30. Id. at 241.
31. Indeed, Asian Americans oppose racial preference at an even greater rate than do
whites. See PETER BROWN, MINORrIY PARTY 286-87 (1991) (citing 1988 Field Poll finding higher
opposition to affirmative action among Asian Americans than among whites in California).
32. See Morin & Warden, supra note 1, at Al (finding 69% of women oppose preferences
for women compared with 76% of men).
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blacks."3 The continued existence of racism, however, does not and
cannot justify broad-based racial preference schemes.3 4 The remedy
for cab drivers who discriminate is to suspend their licenses, not to
apply racial preferences in the hiring of new taxi drivers. The remedy
for racial hoaxes, as Professor Russell argued, may be an enhanced
penalty, not a preference for African-American applicants to Berkeley.
Broad-based racial preferences were never meant as a way of
preventing future discrimination; they were meant as a remedy for
past discrimination, whose present day legacy cannot be addressed by
prospective antidiscriminatory statutes. The Civil Rights Acts of
1964s" and 19913' are necessary bulwarks against contemporary
racism;3 7 racial preferences are almost always an inapprpriate
response. We can get beyond racial preference without getting
entirely beyond race, and those proponents of preferences who wish
to blur this distinction only confuse matters.
The second, new noncompensatory argument advanced suggests
that racial preferences are necessary to create a desirable racial
diversity in universities and other settings. In the panel discussion,
Professor Burt Wechsler argued that "no blacks" would be admitted
to some leading universities without racial preference.' Mr. Phil
Nash said universities should consider race in admissions, because
universities employ all sorts of nonacademic considerations, such as,
preferences for legacies and oboe players.3 9
33. Michael Quintanilla, Divided We Stand, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at El (describing rush
to blame innocent minority or ethnic groups or individuals for crimes against whites).
34. By contrast, the racial discrimination of a particular employer can justify narrowly
tailored remedies to proven discrimination. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185
(1987) (upholding district court's racial hiring quota enacted in response to pervasive, systemic,
and obstinate discrimination by Alabama Department of Public Safety).
35. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(e)
(1994)) (enforcing right to vote, ordering desegregation of public facilities and education, and
establishing Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity to enforce prohibition against
employment discrimination).
36. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.) (providing stronger remedies and additional protections for victims of intentional and
unintentional discrimination in workplace).
37. An increasing number of conservatives have actually called for a repeal of civil rights
protections in the private sector. See, eg., DINESH D'SOuzA, THE END OF RACISM 544 (1995)
(advocating repeal of 1964 Civil Rights Act); RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 413-21
(1992) (arguing that dominance of freedom of contract and voluntary market transactions
should prevail in private employment situations). Roger Pilon of the CATO Institute also
advocated this position on the first panel. See Conference, supra note 28, at Part I; see also Roger
Pilon, Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Freedom: Sorting Out the Issues, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 775
(1996). These arguments are quite shortsighted for the reasons outlined in the first panel by
Brenda Wright. See Conference, supra note 28, at Part I.
38. Conference, supra note 28, at Part IV.
39. Conference, supra note 28, at Part IV.
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Professor Wechsler's claim is an obvious overstatement. While it is
clearly true that without racial preference, the number of African-
American students at elite universities will decline, some will be
admitted without preference and many more will be admitted with a
race-neutral preference for students from low-income families. More
still will be admitted if a definition of "class" is adopted that accurately
reflects the aggregate difference between black poverty and white
poverty. Such a definition therefore must consider concentrations of
poverty, wealth measurements, and family structure."
Mr. Nash's analogy between racial preferences, alumni preferences,
and preferences for oboe-players is also flawed. Alumni preferences,
like racial preferences, are genetically determined, having nothing to
do with the individual effort or character of the applicant, and should
be abolished. It is a sign of the decline of the moral authority of the
civil rights movement when one of its arguments for racial preferenc-
es is that they are no worse than alumni preferences. Moreover, it is
truly bizarre to equate skin color with ability to play an oboe (or to
play football). One's talent as a musician or athlete is honed through
hard work and individual effort. Race is an accident of birth which
is utterly immutable. That the two categories can be so casually
lumped together is a sign of the ease with which we have become
accustomed to thinking in racial terms.
American society is not likely to be in a position to "get beyond"
race any time soon. Race conscious, but nonpreferential, civil rights
statutes are necessary to address contemporary discrimination. It is
time to get beyond racial preferences, however, and all their toxic
side effects. Class-based affirmative action addresses the legacy of
discrimination in a way that is more sustainable, legally and politically.
In addition, the class-based program would free us to move on to
Martin Luther King's more ambitious agenda of creating genuine
equal opportunity for disadvantaged Americans across race and
gender lines.
40. See generally Richard D. Kahlenberg, Equal Opportunity ritics, NEV REPUBLIC, July 17,
1995, at 20, 21 (arguing that sophisticated definition of "disadvantage" will yield greater
representation of minorities in universities than straight income-based definition).
